Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Fine-grained, logic, philosophy: statements can be be more or less detailed. E.g. the fine-grained statement (x)(y)(x = y > (N(x = x) > N(x = y))) could be displayed in a coarse-grained way as A > B. For the decision of problems the coarse-grained form is often inadequate. See also decidability, possible worlds, situation semantics, possible world semantics, hyperintensionality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Ned Block on Fine-grained/ coarse-grained - Dictionary of Arguments
Fodor IV 169 Fine-Grained/Twin Earth/Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Theory/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problems with the twin earth point in to a different direction than Frege's problems (intension/extension). Frege: needs more fine-grained concepts as extensions Putnam: needs less fine-grained than extensional equivalence. (Narrower conception): Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally distinguished. (Water/Twin-Earth Water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT) will hardly work. Solution/Block: "Two Factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: A) Actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 B) Independent, possibly causal, theory of the reference: (Twin Earth/Water/Twin-Earth Water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: this has almost nothing to do with CRT. Moreover, neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) is available. But let's assume it anyway: For example, we make the distinction of meaning/reference with the "two-factor" theory: we then have enough distinction ability, but pay a high price: Question: What actually holds the two factors together? E.g. what prevents the existence of an expression whose inferential role corresponds to the expression "4 is a prime number" and whose content is "water is wet"? But what would it mean? And what would be expressed? The problem is repeated at the level of metatheory: What holds a theory of extension and a theory of meaning together? BlockVsVs: it is clear to him, and what he says about it is puzzling: "the conceptual role is primarily in the determination of the nature of the reference, but not vice versa." IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to say that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is, after all, causally determined according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): Difference: a) Conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water, B) a word class, e.g. name. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that excludes the confusion between extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime number/wetness"? Block: T is not a kind-term, if the causal theory of kind-terms is not true for it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that just does not prevent "water" from having the extension of a kind-concept and at the same time the logic of a number concept. >Twin Earth, >Extension, >Intensions, >Causal theory of names._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
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> Counter arguments against Block
> Counter arguments in relation to Fine-grained/ coarse-grained
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27